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PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO A PRE-TERMINATION
HEARING UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
In two recent cases' involving the non-retention of untenured faculty
members,' the Supreme Court has established an important new policy for
determining a person's due process right to a hearing. The two decisions
have implications far beyond the academic area, suggesting (1) that all
public employees may be entitled to a hearing prior to dismissal and
(2) that a hearing may be required before governmental benefits other
than employment may be terminated or refused.
The plaintiff in Perry v. Sinderiman,' after having taught in the
Texas state university system for ten years, was told by the state Board
of Regents that his year-to-year contract would not be renewed. The
Board's decision was allegedly influenced by the fact that Professor Sin-
derman had been a strong proponent of converting the junior college in
which he taught to a four-year institution-a position which the Board
vigorously opposed.
In his complaint, Sinderman claimed first, that his non-retention
abridged his first amendment right of free speech and secondly, that the
Board's refusal to provide a hearing constituted a denial of his right to
due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' decision' to remand the first amendment issue for further findings
of fact.' More importantly, the Court stated that a hearing would be
granted if, on remand, the District Court found that "de facto" tenure
1. Perry v. Sinderman, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972) ; Board of Regents
v. Roth, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).
2. These cases resolved a long-standing controversy among the circuit courts as to
whether untenured faculty have a right to an administrative hearing in the absence of
violations of specific constitutional rights. According to some courts, a hearing was
never necessary. Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denicd, 402 U.S. 972 (1971) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969). Others decided that a hearing was
necessary only when an expectancy of re-employment existed. Lucas v. Chapman, 430
F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970). For a
discussion of Roth and Sinderman, see Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the
Untenired, 58 AAUP BULLlTIN 267 (1972). See also Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuxE L.J. 841 [hereinafter cited as Teachers'
Rights]; Note, 40 FoRDHAm L. REv. 342 (1971); Note, 85 HAav. L. REv. 1327 (1972);
Developments in the Law--Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
3. - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972).
4. Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
5. The Court stated that "[the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech." - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2697. Among the cases cited to
support this statement were: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denial of wel-
fare) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment compensation) ;
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existed.'
In presenting his case, Sinderman was hindered by the fact that
Texas, unlike most states, 7 has no statutory provision regarding tenure.'
Consequently, Sinderman was forced to rely upon portions of the univer-
sity's faculty guide and a Board of Regents' policy paper'" to show the
existence of "de facto" tenure in the Texas system.
The same constitutional issues treated in Sinderman were also in-
volved in Board of Regents v. Roth.1 ' Mr. Roth was a first-year instruc-
tor at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. The terms of his contract
did not guarantee reemployment. Unlike Texas, Wisconsin has a statu-
tory tenure provision12 which includes both a requirement that written
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (denial of employment) ; Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax exemptions) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952) (denial of employment). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Right-Privilege Distinction].
6. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2700 n.7.
7. Most state statutes concerning tenure provide that teachers may be dismissed only
"for cause." Some statutes specify that "cause" includes such things as insubordination,
immorality, inefficiency, incompetency, disability or neglect of duties. See, e.g., N.Y.
EDuc. LAW § 3012.2 (McKinney 1970). Other statutes phrase the cause requirement in
more general terms. For example, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31(1) (b) (Supp.1971), pro-
vides that "[tihe employment of a teacher who has become permanently employed under
this section may not be terminated involuntarily, except for causes upon written charges."
8. Prior to Roth and Sinderman, the absence of statutory tenure provisions meant
that a teacher's procedural rights were governed by his contract. Even then, however, a
teacher could be dismissed only "for cause" during the term of the contract. Parker v
Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S 1030 (1966). Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, - U.S. , ,
92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972).
9. The Faculty Guide stated:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as
long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a co-
operative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors.
Perry v. Sinderman, - U.S. - , - , 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2699 (1972).
10. The Board Policy Paper provided:
In the Texas public colleges and universities, this tenure system should have
these components: (1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time
instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall
not exceed seven years, including within this period full-time service in all in-
stitutions of higher education. . . . (3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a
faculty member with tenure may be established by demonstrating professional
incompetence, moral turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities.
- U.S. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2699 n.6.
11. - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).
12. All teachers in any state university shall initially be employed on proba-
tion. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior,
after appointment and acceptance thereof for a sixth consecutive year in the
state university system as a teacher.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31(1) (a) (Supp. 1971).
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charges be presented" and a provision for a hearing in cases of dismis-
sal.14  However, this tenurial protection is effective only after six con-
tinuous years of service." When Roth was notified that his one-year
contract was not being renewed he brought suit in federal court claiming
that such a dismissal would cause a deprivation of his first amendment
rights. Roth further alleged that he had a due process right to a hearing
before dismissal.' The district court retained the first amendment issue
for further hearing,"7 while the due process issue was appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Justice Stewart, writing in Roth, set the framework on which the
hearing issue would be analyzed. He first stated that the requirements
for fourteenth amendment procedural due process applied only to depri-
vations of liberty or property interests."8  Moreover, he stated that the
determination of procedural due process was not to be made by applying
the traditional balancing test,'" which weighed an individual's interest in a
hearing against the burden on the state in providing one. Instead, Stewart
examined the nature of the interest to determine whether liberty or prop-
erty was involved.2" Stewart then examined Roth's protectible interests
under the due process clause. He first determined that no deprivation of
13. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
14. Upon request, "[t]he board of regents shall hear the case and provide such
teacher with a written statement as to its decision." VIs. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (1) (b)
(Supp. 1971).
15. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 37.31(1) (a) (Supp. 1971). At the time Roth was decided
Wisconsin provided tenure after four continuous years. Id. § 37.31(1).
16. Roth's action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). This is the
procedure most commonly used by teachers dismissed in violation of specific constitu-
tional rights or due process. The jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, which is 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3), was the subject of a recent case, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972). In Lynch, the Court interpreted the language of § 1343(3) to
include property rights as well as personal rights.
17. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
18. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2705.
19. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), is
usually cited as the source of the balancing test. In Cafeteria Workers, the Court stated
that
consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
governmental function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.
Id. at 895.
The balancing test was eliminated in Morrissey v. Brewer, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct.
2593 (1972), where the Court stated:
The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether
the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or
property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2600.
20. - U.S. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
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liberty had occurred, reasoning that permitting a contract to lapse can
affect one's liberty only if one's name, reputation, or integrity is at stake,2'
or, if non-retention imposes a stigma which forecloses an individual's
freedom to pursue similar employment elsewhere. 22
Justice Stewart next turned to the question of whether Roth had a
property interest in his job sufficient to require a hearing under the due
process clause. He noted that property interests can be created by statute,
as in Goldberg v. Kelly,2" where a state law created a right to welfare bene-
fits which would be safeguarded by a hearing in case of termination.
Stewart cited statutory tenure as an example of a property interest in
employment created by the state.24 A property interest can also be created
by contract, express" or implied." The Court held, however, that Roth
did not have a sufficient property interest and stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
27
In order to determine what constitutes a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment, absent any express guidelines, one must turn back to the Sinderman
case. Sinderman alleged that a binding understanding had been created
by statements and policies of the Board of Regents which entitled him to
a type of "de facto tenure."" The Court's acceptance of this argument is
evidenced by the following statement:
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due
21. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2707. For similar holdings, see Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) ; United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
22. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2707. Using this analysis, the Roth Court also
determined that no deprivation of liberty had occurred in Sinderinan. The Court noted
that neither Roth nor Sinderman would incur greater hardship in obtaining another po-
sition than any other employee who must explain the reasons surrounding the termina-
tion of his previous employment. - U.S. at - , - , 92 S. Ct. at 2698, 2707.
23. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Citing Goldsmith v. United States Tax Board of Appeals,
270 U.S. 117 (1926), the Roth Court also stated that administrative standards create
property interests. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2708 n.15.
24. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2709, citing Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956) In Slochower, the Court held that a New York professor could not
be dismissed for his failure to answer questions regarding Communist party membership.
25. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2709, citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
.1952), where the Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting the payment of salary to
state employees refusing to sign a loyalty oath.
26. - U.S. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2709.
27. Id. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2709.
28. See Johnson v. Fraky, 41 U.S.L.W. 2290 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1972), which held
that a teacher who had been continuously employed for 29 years was entitled to a
hearing.
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process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit un-
derstandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit
and that he may invoke at a hearing ...
[A] bsence of . . . an explicit contractual provision may not
always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a "property"
interest in reemployment.2"
When determining Sinderman's legitimate expectations, the Court ex-
amined all the facts, customs, and surrounding circumstances of the case
rather than applying a rigid formula or requiring the presence of a single
characteristic such as an explicit statutory tenure provision."s
SINDERMAN, ROTH AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CASES
Cases in which a discharged public employee brings suit under the
fourteenth amendment 3 to demand reinstatement pose perplexing prob-
29. Perry v. Sinderman, - U.S. - , - , 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2699-2700 (1972).
30. The Court remanded to the District Court for a determination of whether an
understanding on tenure could be implied from the policies and practices of Odessa Col-
lege. If such an understanding is found, Sinderman will have a property interest in his
job which assures him of an administrative hearing prior to discharge. - U.S. at - ,
92 S. Ct. at 2700. If a hearing is allowed, there is the additional problem of what form
it should take. The Roth Court recognized that this issue is to be decided in a different
manner than the issue of whether a hearing should take place at all:
[a] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of
hearing required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to de-
termine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the "weight" but to the ntature of the interest at stake.
Id. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
In the welfare area, the Court has stated that both notice and an administrative
hearing involving confrontation are required to satisfy the due process clause. Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 266, 269 (1970). It has been suggested that these requirements should
also apply in teacher dismissal cases. Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure:" Toward a
Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 475 (1971). An adminis-
trative hearing benefits the dismissed employee because it tends to expose deception by
the governmental employer. It is also less costly to the discharged employee than judi-
cial processes in terms of money and time. See Teachers' Rights, supra note 2, at 858-
60. Obviously, however, conflicts can arise when the institution responsible for the dis-
charge also conducts the hearing. K. DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TEXT §§ 12.01-12.06
(3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
31. In addition to these cases, there are those involving deprivation of specific con-
stitutional guarantees. In the past, the notion that employment was a revocable privilege
prevented the Court from invalidating conditions of employment which might have in-
fringed such guarantees. The most pithy statement of the privilege philosophy came from
Justice Holmes, who told a discharged policeman, "[t]he petitioner may have a consti-
tutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). The
privilege theory in the employment area was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Baily v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Beginning with a decision that a state cannot attach an unconstitutional condition to
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lems for courts because of the wide discretion granted their employers. If
a meaningful hearing is provided by custom or statute, as in the case of
statutory tenure, the problem for the courts is the familiar one of re-
viewing an administrative body's action for abuse of discretion."2 If not,
the question is whether due process requires an administrative hearing
prior to the employee's dismissal. Before Roth and Sinderman this task
was difficult since it was hard for courts to perceive exactly how the plain-
tiff had been deprived of "life, liberty or property."3
Various legal theories have been developed to circumvent this prob-
lem.3' The most common one shifts the focus from the employee's right
the "privilege" of using its roads, Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S.
583 (1926), the Supreme Court has cut away at the privilege doctrine in cases involving
specific constitutional rights. In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the
Court stated that a public employee cannot be forced to give up his right to free speech
as a condition of employment. However, the Court stated that the degree of protected
speech might vary from case to case according to the interests of the individual and the
state. Id. at 573. See also Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, modified, 425 F.2d 469
(1968), affd, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Further erosion of the privilege theory occurred in Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (the "right" to attend school cannot
be conditioned on the relinquishment of the right to free speech) ; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation may not be conditioned on the giving
up of freedom of religion) ; Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (public
employment cannot be conditioned on the relinquishment of fifth amendment rights).
See also Right-PrIvilege Distinwtion, supra note 5; Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARv. L. Rxv. 1595 (1960) ; Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
32. DAvis, supra note 30, §§ 28.01-28.07. For the courts' handling of cases arising
under the Civil Service Act, see Dew v. Ialaby. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) ; Norden v. Royall, 90 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1949). See also
Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging Judicial Role, 66 COLuiS. L. Rv.
719 (1966).
33. The leading case illustrating this point is Baily v. Richardson. 182 F.2d 46
(1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). There Baily was dis-
charged from her governmental position for alleged disloyalty. The court stated that
"[d]ue process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to
which he has a right." 182 F.2d at 58. See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
Some courts have gone so far as to state that an employer has an absolute right to dis-
miss an employee in the absence of violations of specific constitutional guarantees. Jones
v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405
F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
34. Some writers have argued that there is a constitutional right to be free from
arbitrary action. See Frakt, Non-Teachers and the Constitution, 18 KAN. L. REV. 27
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Frakt] ; Note, Constitutional Rights of Public Employees:
Progress Toward Protection, 49 N.C. L. REv. 302 (1971). There is dicta to support
these writers' views:
Fairness of procedure is "due process in the primary sense" . . . It is ingrained
in our national traditions and is designed to maintain them. In a variety of
situations the Court has enforced this requirement by checking attempts of ex-
ecutives, legislatures, and lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands
of fair-play enshrined in the Constitution.
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to a job to some other right or interest." In cases involving arbitrary
action, the courts have, as yet, been unwilling to protect an individual's
job, but under a due process analysis they have protected other substantial
interest." For example, in Schware v. Board of Examiners 7 the peti-
tioner was refused admission to the New Mexico bar primarily because
of his former membership in the Communist Party. The Supreme Court
concluded that Schware's interests were protectible under the due process
clause. The disastrous effect of disqualification on the future career of the
applicant was sufficient reason to overturn the determination of the state
bar examiners." In other words, whenever an entire field of endeavor
is foreclosed, the consequence is more akin to a loss of liberty, than merely
if a specific job is lost.
Birnbaum v. TrusselP' is another example of a substantial interest
protected by due process. In that case, a white physician was dismissed
without a hearing from a New York City Hospital due to alleged bias
against blacks. The Court of Appeals, emphasizing the injury to both
the physician's reputation and his ability to pursue his career, stated:
[W]henever there is a substantial interest, other than employ-
ment by the state, invoked in the discharge of a public employee,
he can be removed neither on arbitrary grounds nor without a
procedure calculated to determine whether legtimate grounds
do exist.4"
Courts in similar cases have consistently shown a willingness to protect
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
By confining due process protection to liberty or property interests under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Roth and Sindermnan destroyed the possibility of expanding the "arbi-
trary action" doctrine. As Justice Stewart stated, "[wihen protected interests are im-
plicated the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But the range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite." Board of Regents v. Roth, -
U.S. -, -, 92 S. St. 2701, 2705 (1972).
35. For example, in employment cases involving deprivation of specific constitu-
tional rights, the Court focuses on such rights rather than the "right" to a job. See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Right-Privilege Distinction,
supra note 5.
36. See Meredith v. Allen County Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir.
1968) ; Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
37. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See also Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness,
373 U.S. 96 (1963) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) ; Kalven
& Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan
and Justice Black, 21 LAW IN TRANSITION 155 (1961).
38. 353 U.S. at 238-39. See also Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
39. 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
40. Id. at 678.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
individuals whose name or reputation is at stake.41 Again, this interest
can be protected despite the fact that the job itself is not.
In the absence of either an injury to one's reputation or the foreclo-
sure of an entire field of endeavor, the courts have been less solicitous of
dismissed employees. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,"2 petitioner
worked as a cook in a private food concession within a military base. On
orders from the commanding officer she was discharged without a hear-
ing, purportedly for security reasons. The Court distinguished this case
from Schware by pointing out that the private interest in this case was not
the right to pursue a profession, but simply the right to a particular job.43
The Court went on to say that while an employee cannot be dismissed arbi-
trarily, if the causes are unstated but could be reasonable the Court will
not require a hearing.44 Therefore, in few cases will an employee's in-
terest in a specific job be so important that it entitles him to the procedural
protection of a hearing.
The Court in Roth and Sinderman followed the pattern of these cases
by retaining the "substantial interest" concept. However, this concept
was further developed by requiring the petitioner to identify a liberty or
property interest under the fourteenth amendment. For example, the
cases dealing with admission to the state bar are cited by Justice Stewart
in Roth to indicate that foreclosure of a field of endeavor is an abridgment
of liberty,4" hence protectible by due process requirements. Moreover, the
fact that the Court cited Cafeteria Workers twice during its discussion of
what constitutes liberty implies that the Court still does not regard the
dismissal of an employee from a specific job as a protectible interest.46
Thus, in those cases where dismissal takes place in circumstances involv-
41. See note 21 supra & text accompanying.
42. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
43. Id. at 895-96.
44. We may assume that Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been
excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for her exclusion had
been patently arbitrary. . . . It does not follow, however, that she was entitled
to notice and a hearing when the reason advanced for her exclusion was . . .
entirely rational.
367 U.S. at 898.
Justice Brennan pointed out the contradiction in the Court's analysis:
In sum, the Court holds that petitioner has a right not to have her identification
badge taken away for an "arbitrary" reason, but no right to be told in detail
what the reason is. . . . That is an internal contradiction to which I cannot
subscribe.
Id. at 901 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Frakt wrote, the result is that "an administra-
tor can do whatever he wants with a non-tenured and non-protected employee as long as
he doesn't state the reason why he is doing it." Frakt, supra note 34, at 34.
45. Board of Regents v. Roth, - U.S. , , 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2707 (1972).
46. Id. at - , 92 S. Ct at 2707.
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ing a deprivation of liberty, Roth and Sinderman provide little change
from former case law.
Whether the Court's discussion of protectible property interests will
expand due process protections to all public employees remains to be seen.
The Court states that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's procedural pro-
tection of property is a safeguard of the security of interest that a person
has already acquired in specific benefits."4 Clearly the Court's language
is applicable to all forms of property, and there seems little reason for this
rationale to be limited to the interests of teachers. If a teacher can show
the legitimacy of his expectations without reliance on a statutory tenure
provision, other public employees should be permitted to exhibit similar
expectancies.48
APPLICATION OF THE SINDERMAN-ROTH TEST TO OTHER AREAS
Roth and Sinderman have implications for those due process cases
which involve governmental benefits other than employment.4" Welfare
cases are one category which will probably be affected. In Goldberg v.
Kelly,50 certain welfare recipients sought a hearing prior to the cessation
of benefits in order to assure the validity of any possible termination or-
der. The Court balanced the interests of both the recipients and the state,
placing much emphasis on the "brutal need" facing the welfare recipients
whose aid was, or would be cut off."' Thus, although the Court did not
label welfare payments as property, it did grant the hearing.52
In light of Roth and Sinderman, if the fact situation existent in Gold-
berg presented itself now, the case would be decided in a methodologically
different manner. Roth's explicit reference to Goldberg as a case involv-
ing a state-created property interest 3 clearly means that the Court now
regards welfare benefits as property. Therefore, the welfare statute vests
the recipient with a property interest in welfare payments, eliminating the
47. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2708.
48. In its discussion of the creation of property interests, the Court analogizes to
the doctrine of "implied contract." In Sinderman, the Court stated:
[A]bsence of . . . an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose
the possibility that a teacher has a "property" interest in re-employment. For
example, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed
a process by which agreemments, though not formalized in writing, may be "im-
plied."
Perry v. Sinderman. - U.S. , , 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2699-2700 (1972).
49. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
50. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. Id. at 261.
52. Id.
53. Board of Regents v. Roth, - U.S. , ,92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972).
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requirement of a balancing test to determine whether hearings are required
before termination can take place. Statutory entitlement, moreover, per-
tains not only to those presently receiving benefits, but also to those wish-
ing to prove their eligibility."
In other types of cases involving statutes and administrative stand-
ards, one effect of Roth and Sinderrnan will be to rest the granting of hear-
ings on firmer, more predictable ground since courts need not engage in
an imprecise balancing test. The difficulties many lower courts have en-
countered in ruling upon hearing requests will thus be avoided. An ex-
ample of such past difficulty is Torres v. New York State Department of
Labor5 where plaintiff was initially deemed eligible for unemployment
compensation pursuant to a state statute. Some time after the first pay-
ment, the employer protested that the plaintiff had been discharged for
good cause, making him statutorily ineligible for compensation. This
prompted review of the petitioner's unemployment application, which re-
sulted in termination of payments. A three-judge federal court held, two
to one, that a full hearing prior to termination was unnecessary since the
importance of these payments to the individual did not outweigh the gov-
ernmental interest in conserving agency time and expense."8 The dis-
senting judge argued that unemployment insurance recipients were nor-
mally low-income persons who would be faced with a "brutal need" in the
absence of unemployment payments." After Roth and Sinderman, such
54. Referring to Goldberg, the Court in Roth stated: "The recipients had not yet
shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibiliy. But we held that
they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so." - U.S. at -,
92 S. Ct. at 2709.
55. 321 F. Supp. 432, affd on rehearing, 333 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 1185 (1972).
56. 321 F. Supp. at 437.
57. Id. at 438-40. "Indeed, such evidence as exists in the record of this case estab-
lishes that for the year 1967, 42 per cent of the claimants for unemployment benefits had
an annual income of less than $3,000 and 75 per cent an annual income of less than
$5,000." Id. at 439.
Torres was eventually affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court. - U.S.
- , 92 S. Ct. 1185 (1972). Prior to this affirmance, however, the Court had remanded
Torres for a rehearing, 402 U.S. 968 (1971), to take account of California Department of
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) ; in Java, the Court had held that auto-
matic termination of unemployment payments upon notice to the state unemployment
agency was contrary to the spirit of the Social Security Act, which required prompt pay-
ment of benefits. On remand, the District Court in Torres reaffirmed its previous deci-
sion, distinguishing Java by saying that it involved automatic termination, whereas the
New York statute in Torres provided for termination only after an interview. This was
the District Court decision affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Since Java was not decided on constitutional grounds, one can only speculate as to
whether the Supreme Court's affirmance involved a determination of a constitutional is-
sue. If it did, one still does not know whether the Court was affirming the now out-
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difficulties in balancing can be avoided since the focus has now shifted to
the nature of the individual's interest rather than its weight, and thus an
analysis of a plaintiff's "brutal need" is no longer necessary."
CONCLUSION
Sizderman and Roth establish a new definition of property which
recognizes statutory, administrative, and contractual entitlements as in-
terests requiring a hearing under the due process clause. This new con-
cept affects all governmental benefits created in these ways. As a result,
a state-created interest like welfare will be treated as property for due
process purposes, thus necessitating a hearing prior to the termination of
benefits.
Furthermore, by introducing the concept of legitimate claim of en-
titlement, the Court has presented the possibility of extending the notion of
property. Sinderman, for example, secured a hearing by showing that a
mutually explicit understanding existed between himself and the univer-
sity administration. This provided him with a legitimate claim to em-
ployment. Although there is no particular reason to limit the case's ap-
plication, it is uncertain how far the Court will extend this notion of
property." At the very least, Roth and Sinderman establish a new way
of examining the concept of property under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
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moded balancing test, or whether it was stating that the New York procedure met mini-
mal standards of due process.
58. Prior to Roth and Sindcrman, the Supreme Court had encouraged an analysis of
"brutal need." For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court
had stated:
[T]he crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent re-
sources, his situation becomes immediately desperate.
Id. at 264. See also Note, Tie Growth of Procedural Due Process Into New Substance,
66 Nw. L. REv. 502 (1971).
The Supreme Court has now indicated that its past decisions had "little or nothing
to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life." Fuentes v. Sevin, - U.S. , , 92
S. Ct. 1983, 1998 (1972).
59. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger attempted to limit the holding:
The Court holds today only that a state-employed teacher who has a right to
re-employment under state law, arising from either an express or implied con-
tract, has, in turn, a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to some
form of prior administrative or academic hearing on the cause for nonrenewal
of his contract.
Perry v. Sinderman, - U.S. , 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2717 (1972).
